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tion.8
There is a wide gap, however, between theory and
practice when it comes to Japanese criminal procedure. Japan’s system has been described as “predominantly inquisitorial,”9 and most scholars and legal
practitioners argue that the balance of power tilts in
favor of the prosecution to an extent that actually
strips defendants of many of the rights they receive in
America.10 Some scholars have even suggested that the
central goals of the two systems are radically different
in that Japan seeks “not to assure that the rights of
the criminally accused are protected but rather to
assure ‘substantive justice’ in the sense that all those
who have committed crimes are found guilty.”11
There thus appears to be a clear disconnect between the system’s intended operation as designed in
1948 and its modern function. The story of how this
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Introduction
Criminal procedure in Japan lives a multifaceted
existence. Enacted as part of the American Occupation
in Japan on July 10, 1948, the current Code of Criminal Procedure, on one hand, goes to great lengths to
implement an adversarial process of justice that
secures the rights of defendants. The code, for example, devotes twelve articles to defining the right to
counsel for defendants;1 grants defendants the right to
refuse questioning so long as they are not under
arrest;2 stipulates rules of evidence that require a
standard of “beyond any reasonable doubt” for conviction;3 requires an indictment process before trial;4
mandates a trial led by a single judge;5 offers defendants protection against self-incrimination;6 and the
right to cross-examination;7 and perhaps most importantly of all, places the burden of proof on the prosecu1
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dure is divided into two camps: one that focuses
almost exclusively on the concrete changes brought
forth by the 1948 code, and a second that focuses on
the cultural forces driving the current practice in
criminal practice.

disconnect appeared, however, is one that has not
been explored by scholars of Japanese criminal procedure. The objective of this study is to piece that story
together.
This paper is split into three sections. First, we
survey the literature on Japanese criminal procedure.
Although scholars have yet to directly confront this
disconnect directly, we are able to infer that one
probable explanation as to why practice may differ
from theory with respect to Japanese criminal procedure is that the 1948 code fundamentally clashed with
deeply seated cultural beliefs regarding the law and
justice.
The next two sections attempt to test this hypothesis. First, we examine the concrete changes of the new
code, with special attention on the Anglo-American
traditions embedded within the reforms. Next, we
evaluate the Japanese response. Though no
population-wide surveys were issued at the time, and
English primary source data regarding the code is
scarce, some of the most impactful Japanese legal
scholars of the time drafted pieces in English concerning the new code in the 1963 volume of Law in Japan:
A New Order in a Changing Society. Using the arguments of Takeyoshi Kawashima, Judge Kohji Tanabe,
and Atsushi Nagashima—three scholars who had a
significant voice in shaping the modern Japanese
criminal justice landscape—we gain evidence supporting the hypothesis that the reforms of the 1948 code
were fundamentally in opposition with Japanese legal
culture.

Camp One: Concrete Changes of 1948
The first camp focuses almost exclusively on the
concrete changes brought forth by the 1948 code.
Championed by scholars like Richard Appleton and
Hiroshi Oda, the thesis propagated by this school is
quite uniform: the 1948 code brought with it distinctly
American legal principles not before implemented in
Japan.12 As noted above, such reforms included
provisions establishing the rights to counsel and
cross-examination, the threshold of beyond a reasonable doubt, and even layperson jury trials in some
areas of Japan.13 We will examine the changes imposed
12

See Richard B. Appleton, “Reforms in Japanese Criminal
Procedure under Allied Occupation,” Washington Law Review
and State Bar Journal 24 (1949): 401; Kôya Matsuo, “The
Development of Criminal Law in Japan since 1961,” in Law in
Japan: A Turning Point (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2008); Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law, Third edition, 2011,
436–442; Shigemitsu Dandô, Japanese Criminal Procedure,
Publications of the Comparative Criminal Law Project ; v. 4
(Berkley, CA: The University of California Press, 1965), 12–22.
13
Jury trials were conducted on Okinawa during the
American Occupation. See: Anna Dobrovolskaia, “An All-Laymen
Jury System Instead of the Lay Assessor System for Japan?
Anglo-American-Style Jury Trials in Okinawa under the US
Occupation,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2004, 5780; Hiroshi Fukurai, “The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury
and Grand Jury Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal
Consciousness and Lay Participation in Japan and the U.S.,”

Historiography
The literature regarding Japanese criminal proce-
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cutor.”16 In addition to being compensated fairly well
and having light caseloads and little crime to prosecute
in the first place, prosecutors enjoy an unprecedented
amount of procedural power. The principle of “voluntary investigation” allows them to process over four
fifths of their cases on an “at-home” basis, away from
“judicial scrutiny;” evidence admission rules strongly
favor the prosecution over the defense; prosecutors are
allowed to order arrests without warrants and hold
suspects in detention cells before they have filed
charges; and prosecutors are able to question suspects
for up to twenty-three days on a single charge, summarizing statements in their own words.17 In addition,
they have the ability to appeal any unfavorable sentence or verdict, including acquittals.18
Defense attorneys, on the other hand, suffer from
a “lack of weapons.”19 Japanese courts often recognize
“broad exceptions to the right to silence” and have
relaxed standards to allow prosecutors to restrict
meeting capabilities with clients. They also commonly
place restrictions on the ability for defense attorneys to
compel discovery.20
It is important to note, however, that the role of the
defense attorney is starkly different to what one finds
in the American system. Defense attorneys have no
need for most of the “weapons” utilized by American
defense attorneys because they are expected to cooper-

by the 1948 code in greater detail in the next section.
Camp Two: Culturist Perspective on Current Japanese
Criminal Procedure
The second camp evaluates the various aspects of
Japanese criminal procedure from a culturist perspective. This body of literature is vast, but seems to focus
on one major aspect of Japanese criminal procedure:
the inquisitorial nature of the system in practice.14
An adversarial system has two crucial components:
1) a formal separation of the judge and prosecutor, in
which “the prosecutor determines the object of proceedings and the judge is a passive and impartial
adjudicator,” and 2) a balance of power between the
prosecutor and defense attorney when it comes to
making their claims.15 Though the first was firmly
established in Japan by the 1948 code, the second has
been far from achieved.
David Johnson calls Japan “a paradise for a proseCornell International Law Journal, 2007, 315-359.
14
Daniel H. Foote, “Reflections on Japan’s Cooperative
Adversary Process,” in The Japanese Adversary System in
Context, 2002. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan, 454–500;
Johnson, “Criminal Justice in Japan”; Setsuo Miyazawa,
“Introduction: An Unbalanced Adversary System--Issues,
Policies, and Practices in Japan, in Context and in Comparative
Perspective,” in The Japanese Adversary System in Context (New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1–12; Satoru Shinomiya,
“Adversarial Procedure without a Jury: Is Japan’s System
Adversarial, Inquisitorial, or Something Else?,” in The Japanese
Adversary System in Context (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002), 114–28.
15
Miyazawa, “Introduction: An Unbalanced Adversary
System--Issues, Policies, and Practices in Japan, in Context and
in Comparative Perspective,” 2.
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See Chapter 1, Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice.
Ibid., 36.
18
Loc cit.
19
Foote, “Reflections on Japan’s Cooperative Adversary
Process,” 32.
20
Ibid., 32–33.
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exam24 are then selected for apprenticeships at the
Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office in preparation for a
career as a prosecutor. Indeed, to become a prosecutor, one has to be among the best legal minds in the
nation. As of 2004 the state imposed a quota of prosecutors at 1,508 nationwide.25
It is, therefore, understandable that these individuals occupy a rank in the Japanese social hierarchy.
Indeed, as Johnson puts it: “to find a comparable
official elite in the United States, one would have to
turn to those who staffed the E-Ring of the Pentagon,
or the Central Intelligence Agency at the height of the
Cold War.”26
This imbalance of power also represents what
Goodman calls “a priority on substantive justice.”27
The group orientation of Japanese society implies that
“the rights of the few may have to be sacrificed to
protect the public welfare” of the whole.28 Thus, the
goal of the system is not to protect individual
rights—to ensure that each player in the game gets a
fair shot—but to get to the truth. Prosecutors take the
lead in achieving that objective, and everything else,
from the rules of the game to those who play it, is
there to facilitate them in doing so.
A number of other scholars agree with Goodman’s

ate with the prosecution from investigation to sentencing. In fact, “prosecutors routinely police defense
lawyers to ensure that their behavior does not depart
too far from the norms of constructive, cooperative
engagement.”21 Those who do go out of line are punished and branded as “radical leftists.”22 The entire
functionality of the system rests in the hands and
trust of the prosecution, and the defense’s role is, in
part, to support that system.
Perhaps most interesting, however, is that this
aspect of Japan’s criminal process is believed to have
cultural roots. Castberg, for instance, argues that the
traditional values of respecting and deferring to
authority are inherent to the prosecutor’s elevation.23
When one acknowledges the prestige awarded to
prosecutors, it is clearer why they are treated as high
authority.
Prosecutors in Japan are some of the most respected individuals in society. Primarily, the process of
becoming a prosecutor in Japan is far more selective
than that in America. Though there are 74 law schools
functioning in Japan today, future prosecutors are
generally expected to attend the most elite programs.
Those who sit at the top of their class at the best
schools are recruited for prestigious internships at the
Legal Training and Research Institute, where they
work directly under current prosecutors and prepare
for the bar exam. A select few of those able to pass the

24

It should be noted that this is no easy feat. The bar
passage rate in Japan is currently between 2% and 4%.
25
Hisashi Aizawa, “Japanese Legal Education in
Transition,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 24 (2007):
146–149.
26
Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice, 48.
27
Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan, 447.
28
Ibid., 454.

21

Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice, 77.
Loc. cit.
23
Castberg, “Prosecutorial Independence in Japan,” 39.
22
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characterization.29 Some have even gone so far as to
say that these cultural forces will prevent any adversarial reform—such as a jury system—from being
implemented successfully.30 However, the important
note of agreement among all these scholars is that the
inquisitorial nature of the system is a reflection of the
country’s attitudes towards crime and justice.
Thus, it seems that the major lessons we can draw
from the literature are: a) that the changes of 1948
were American inspired, b) that the current system is
not American, and c) that the current system is, to
some degree, linked to culture. What has yet to be
determined, however, is just how the disconnect
between the terms of the 1948 code and contemporary
practice occurred.
It seems, however, that we can piece together a
hypothesis. Indeed, given that the cultural factors that
drive the current system are issues that have been in
place in Japan for centuries,31 it seems that one

explanation is that those same forces are what drove
Japanese criminal procedure away from the intentions
of the 1948 code and that the reforms of the code, from
its very conception, clashed so fundamentally with
these cultural tendencies that it could never be fully
adopted into Japanese society in the way the designers
hoped it would be. The next two sections seek to test
that hypothesis.
Part I: The Effect of the 1948 Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP)
The history of Japanese criminal procedure, which
begins centuries before 1948, must be understood
before we can grasp the real impact of the post-war
code. Accordingly, this section is split into two parts.
The first explores how Japanese criminal procedure
functioned prior to 1948, and the second evaluates the
changes brought forth by the 1948 code.
Japanese Criminal Procedure: Pre-1948
The first evidence we have of ancient Japanese
criminal procedure comes from the eighth century.
Writings from the Taiho (701-704) and Yorô (717-724)
periods suggest that in these ancient times, Japan was
using a criminal code of procedure developed in China
during the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907). In these
early codes, judgment had to be based on confession,
and any means, including torture, could be used to
attain it.32
Because this code, however, was ultimately some-

29

Castberg, “Prosecutorial Independence in Japan”; Johnson, “Criminal
Justice in Japan”; Shinomiya, “Adversarial Procedure without a Jury: Is Japan’s
System Adversarial, Inquisitorial, or Something Else?” Foote, “The Benevolent
Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice”; Haley, “Japan”; Matsuo, “The
Development of Criminal Law in Japan since 1961.”
30
Lester W. Kiss, “Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan,” Law and
Contemporary Problems 62, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 261–83; Robert M. Bloom, “Jury
Trials in Japan,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
28 (2006): 35. It should be noted that in 2009, Japan implemented the “Saiban-in”
jury system, in which lay citizens are chosen at random to act as judges in a case.
Though this brought lay people into the judicial process, the system functions in an
entirely different fashion from the American system. Individuals that are chosen
examine the evidence along with a panel of judges to come to a conclusion; there is
no adversarial debate held in front of the lay people, and judges still play a
significant role in determining guilt.
31
We will examine this briefly in the next section, see: Dan F. Henderson,
“Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law,” Washington Law Review and State Bar Journal 27
(1952): 83; Nobuhiko Kasumi, “Criminal Trials in the Early Meiji Era--with
Particular Reference to the Ukagai/Shirei System,” in Law in Japan: A Turning Point,
trans. Daniel Foote (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Karl Steenstrup,
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explanation is that those same forces are what drove
Japanese criminal procedure away from the intentions
of the 1948 code and that the reforms of the code, from
its very conception, clashed so fundamentally with
these cultural tendencies that it could never be fully
adopted into Japanese society in the way the designers
hoped it would be. The next two sections seek to test
that hypothesis.
Part I: The Effect of the 1948 Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP)
The history of Japanese criminal procedure, which
begins centuries before 1948, must be understood
before we can grasp the real impact of the post-war
code. Accordingly, this section is split into two parts.
The first explores how Japanese criminal procedure
functioned prior to 1948, and the second evaluates the
changes brought forth by the 1948 code.
Japanese Criminal Procedure: Pre-1948
The first evidence we have of ancient Japanese
criminal procedure comes from the eighth century.
Writings from the Taiho (701-704) and Yorô (717-724)
periods suggest that in these ancient times, Japan was
using a criminal code of procedure developed in China
during the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907). In these
early codes, judgment had to be based on confession,
and any means, including torture, could be used to
attain it.32
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system based on the ancient Chinese codes.”36 As was
the case in the Taiho and Yorô periods, torture was
permitted, and all crimes were to “be adjudicated on
the basis of confession.”37
Naturally, these new codes faced extensive opposition, especially in regard to their allowance of torture.
The result was that the period between 1870 and 1880
saw an influx of what scholars have called “piecemeal
reforms.”38 In 1872, for example, members of the press
were allowed into courts for the first time, courts were
officially separated from the office of the public prosecutor, torture in civil cases was prohibited, and the
use of class distinction in trials was formally abolished.39 Furthermore, in 1873, the use of vendettas
was banned. In 1875 an appellate procedure was
recognized, and in 1876 the age-old requisite of
confession for conviction was abolished. Shortly after
in 1877, the use of torture in criminal case investigation was formally banned.40
While all these reforms were being installed,
however, the government was working on a much more
comprehensive project: the Code of Criminal Instruction. Formally passed in 1880, the Code had been
nearly 10 years in the making. In 1870 the Cabinet
established the Bureau for the Investigation of Institutions and charged it with researching French criminal
codes in an effort to design a comprehensive Japanese

thing ‘imported’ into Japan, the bulk of the code faded
away with time. In fact, by the middle of the Heian
period (794-1185) Japan criminal procedure had
transformed into an entirely feudal process. Though
the emphasis on confession remained, proceedings
were no longer controlled by a set of rules. Instead,
officialdom dictated proceedings, as feudal lords and
officials conducted trials in an entirely inquisitorial
fashion.33
This type of system persisted into the Middle Ages,
especially under the Kamakura (1185-1392) and
Muromachi (1392-1573) periods. In medieval practice,
a single local official called the shugo typically rendered judgment. Though this changed slightly in the
Tokugawa Period (1615-1867) to allow for a Supreme
Council called the hyôjôsho to oversee local hearings,
the important takeaway is that in both periods, trials
were conducted in an incredibly inquisitorial fashion,
with local leaders holding wide discretion.34
As was the case with most aspects of Japanese
society, the year 1868 brought immense changes to
criminal procedure. Between the start of the Meiji
Restoration and 1880, several different tentative
reforms were put into place.35 The first attempt at a
new code came in 1870 with the Shinritsukôryô. This
code essentially “amounted to a revival of the old
33
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Taking place entirely before trial, the preliminary
investigation effectively acted as a hearing in which the
defense was not accorded access to counsel, and a
judge made a determination of the case based on
evidence presented by the public prosecutor.44
Though a trial must take place for formal guilt to be
established, one cannot underestimate the weight
placed on this preliminary investigation. Because the
trial judge relied extensively upon the determination of
the preliminary investigation rather than try the case
cold, the outcome of the preliminary investigation
inevitably biased the outcome of trial. In fact, evidence
suggests that many assumed that the outcome of the
preliminary investigation was indeed the final outcome
of the case and that the trial was more of a procedural
loop than a substantive determination of guilt.45
This code remained the dominant authority on
criminal procedure in Japan until the 1920s, when
two new laws came into place. The first was the 1922
Code of Criminal Procedure. Only a slight modification
of the Code of Criminal Instruction, this code drew
heavily on German influences. Given that the major
changes in the 1922 code are the introduction of
expanded rights to the accused, some have argued
that the code reflected the general progressive trend of
the 1920s that favored reform.46
Arguably another reflection of this cultural trend
was the second new law of the 1920s: the 1923 Jury
Law. A milestone for Japanese legal history, this law

code. Accordingly, Professor Gustave Boissonade of the
University of Paris was invited to assist, and eventually
led the drafting of a new penal and procedure code.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the final Code of
Criminal Instruction has undeniably European roots.
Primarily, we see that although the code allowed for an
appointment of counsel for the accused, the prosecutor was still placed on a higher playing field. As in the
French model, the prosecutor was designated to sit
next to the judge at trial and play a key role in determining what witnesses would be called, how evidence
would be presented, and, ultimately, the verdict of the
case.41
This leads us to the second major example of
European influence in the 1880 Code: the inquisitorial
nature of the judge. Indeed, the Japanese judge was
not to play the role of impartial arbiter, as is the case
in a traditional Anglo-American style trial. Instead, he
or she was to act more as a “confessor,” conducting
and manipulating every aspect of the trial from beginning to end.42
A key part of this was what was termed the “preliminary investigation.” There is no direct parallel to
this aspect of old Japanese criminal procedure in the
Anglo-American system, yet it was prominent in the
French and German systems in the late 19th century.43
41
42
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distinction between this system and the Grand Jury system used in the United
States is that the question of indictment fell solely on the judge in the preliminary
investigation. There was no jury; the prosecutors were responsible for all
investigative work, and the judge, using the evidence and analyses of the
prosecutors, made the determination on the case.
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tion, indictment, and trial.48
The primary change in the investigative phase
concerned the relationship between public prosecutors
and police. Whereas in the older codes prosecutors
virtually controlled case investigation, the 1948 CCP
gave substantially more discretion to police, providing
them the ability to seek warrants from the court,
control their own files, and lead crime investigations
without the discretion of the prosecutor’s office.49
Complementing this change was the implementation of a host of safeguards intended to protect the
rights of the defendant. The accused gained the right
to remain silent when detained, and arrests, searches,
and property seizure now required warrants issued by
the courts, rather than by the prosecutor’s office. In
fact, according to the new code, the only circumstances in which a warrant was not required for arrest
were: 1) when police had reasonable grounds to
suspect that the crime was a felony, and 2) when the
criminal was caught in the act.50 Furthermore, the
code mandated that police officers inform the accused
of both the “essential facts of the case” and their right
to counsel, upon arrest.51
We see perhaps even more impactful changes in the
indictment phase. Primarily, the new code placed
limits on how long a suspect could be detained and
gave detainees a right to an explanation of why they

was the first in Japanese history to mandate lay
participation in all criminal cases. Though the system
was similar to the English system in some respects, it
maintained several key differences that brought it
more closely in line with the German/French model
than anything else. For one thing, the “jury had no
power to say guilty or not guilty.”47 This was still the
sole authority of the judge. The jury’s role was instead
restricted to making decisions on questions of fact
posed by the court. Furthermore, their decisions were
non-binding on the court’s ultimate decisions.
Nevertheless, despite the somewhat Anglo-American reforms of the 1920s, one gets the impression
that, prior to 1948, Japanese criminal procedure
maintained its inquisitorial design, in a hodgepodge of
ancient Chinese and modern French and German
influences that came together to shape a system
defined by three fundamental traits: 1) a dominant and
controlling judge; 2) a powerful prosecutor; and 3) an
emphasis on finding the truth via controlled investigation rather than through open debate and deliberation.
After World War II, the American Occupation forces
ordered all of this to change.
Japanese Criminal Procedure: Post-1948
The changes introduced in the 1948 code radically
transformed the Japanese criminal procedure into a
distinctly Anglo-American construction. Though some
of these changes were noted in the introduction to this
paper, we can gain a better understanding of the
impact of the 1948 Code by examining how it altered
three stages of criminal procedure: pre-trial investiga47

48

For a detailed breakdown of the changes brought on by
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49
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50
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51
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were being detained.52 These provisions had the
important effect of changing the prosecution’s strategy
in a case from one focused on gaining a confession to
one focused on the entirety of evidence involved in a
case.53
Perhaps the largest change introduced by the new
code, however, was the elimination of the preliminary
investigation process and the installment of a formal
indictment hearing supervised by the court.54 Under
this system, the primary source of evidence for a court
was no longer the preliminary investigation, led and
controlled by the prosecutor. Instead, the police were
to conduct the pre-trial investigation, and evidence
would be presented to the judge in open court by both
the defense and prosecution for preliminary
judgment.55 The impact of this change cannot be
understated. Not only did it begin to—at least theoretically—equate the power of defense and prosecution,
but it also effectively changed the role of the judge
from that of a “confessor” to more of an unbiased
arbiter. The system had indeed taken a great leap in
becoming adversarial in procedure.56
Leaps were also taken in the trial phase. Once such
change was the strong emphasis placed on the accused actually being present during trial. One of the
central tools in Japanese criminal procedure prior to

Historical Perspectives September 2015

1948 was the summary procedure. Under the summary procedure a judge maintained the discretion to
convict the accused by order without a hearing or prior
proceedings for small, petty offenses.57 The new code
did not entirely eliminate the summary procedure, but
allowed the procedure to be used only if the defendant
presented no objection to the order for summary
procedure seven days after the prosecutor issued it.58
The process by which evidence and witnesses were
presented in trial was also changed in the new code.
Under the old procedure, the presentation of witnesses
and evidence was determined by the prosecutor and
judge exclusively. The new code widened the door of
discretion for the defense, mandating that the court
must listen to the defense’s opinions when determining the order and scope of witness examination.59 In
addition, the defense attorney was granted the right to
an opening statement and cross-examination.60
Perhaps most importantly, however, the 1948 rendition also made conviction something contingent, not
on the judge’s suspicion, but rather on evidence that
conveyed guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” with the
burden of proof placed firmly on the prosecution.61
Though some traditions of the past remained in
57
58

52

59

53

60
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Appleton, “Reforms in Japanese Criminal Procedure
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54
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55
Code of Criminal Procedure (1948), Article 256.
56
Appleton, “Reforms in Japanese Criminal Procedure
under Allied Occupation,” 414.
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place after 1948,62 it seems fair to say that the landscape of Japanese criminal procedure had been
fundamentally redesigned as a result of the new code.
The power and discretion of the prosecutor was
tampered slightly. No longer was a trial allowed to
begin with the court already having a partial opinion
on a case, nor was it the goal of investigation to obtain
a confession. And defense counsel—once restricted to
doing no more than make a passionate closing
statement—was accorded a host of new opportunities
to “speak up and influence the court during public
trial.”63 Moreover, the accused was given greater
rights, especially the right to silence and an attorney,
the protection against evidence or confessions made
under compulsion, and guarantees against prolonged
detention.
All of this had the effect of placing Japan on a road
to adopting a Western, Americanized system of justice.
The seeds were indeed planted. Yet as we know, they
did not grow as expected. As noted above, modern
Japanese procedural justice can be summarized as
“predominantly inquisitorial,”64 with prosecutors
controlling pre-trial investigation, indictment, and
much of the trial itself. Indeed, in many ways, Japanese criminal procedure functions more like it was
designed before 1948 rather than after. To test the
hypothesis that this digression was due to deeply

seated cultural differences in jurisprudence that made
an American system impossible to fully adopt in
Japan, we turn to the works of those writing about
Japanese law in this period of transition.
Part II: The Literati’s Reaction
In this section we turn to evaluate three important
analyses written by scholars reacting to the post-war
changes: 1) Kawashima Takeyoshi’s “Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan,”65 2) Kohji Tanabe’s “The
Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System,”66 and 3) Atsushi Nagashima’s “The
Accused and Society: The Administration of Criminal
Justice in Japan.”67
It should be noted that only Nagashima’s article is
specifically focused on the changes to the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The other two articles are geared
at evaluating changes to the Civil Code. While the
exactitudes of Takeyoshi and Tanabe’s may therefore
seem inapplicable to our analysis, it is important to
recognize the context in which we use their analyses.
We are not using the pieces of these three scholars
for the purposes of evaluating the changes brought by
the 1948 code. That was the purpose of Part I of this
paper. Instead, here we aim to get a glimpse of how
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the problem.”68 In Kawashima’s point of view, one of
the defining attributes of Japanese culture was a
reluctance to take disputes to trial. As he stated in his
opening thesis:

legal scholars reacted to the changes on principle. Did
they see the changes as incompatible with Japanese
legal culture? Did they believe them to be examples of
cultural imperialism, or steps in the right direction?
The focus in this section is, therefore, more centered
on issues of Japanese culture and society than on the
specific features of the changed law.
Furthermore, the changes to the Civil Code were
not so different from the changes to the Criminal Code
that we should expect these scholars’ reactions to be
strikingly different in the case of the Criminal Code.
Indeed, the basic changes were the same; that is, the
post-war codes attempted to transform what was once
an inquisitorial system of justice into an adversarial
one. Thus, even though this sample of scholars is
limited, it paints a clear picture of where the scholarly
community stood in the post-war world.

Rarely will both parties press their claims so far
as to require resort to a court; instead, one of
the disputants will probably offer a satisfactory
settlement or propose the use of some extrajudicial, informal procedure.”69
Kawashima explained that this trend had roots in the
dynamics of “traditional social groups” in Japan.70
Indeed, Kawashima argued that a constant of Japanese culture throughout history has been a strong
sense of hierarchy within communities. Within society,
“each man’s role is contingent on that of the other,”
and circumstance dictates who has the upper social
hand.71
The net effect of these cultural attributes was that,
in Japan, judicial decisions were not naturally based
on universalistic standards. A system premised on
social equality could not feasibly function in a society
built on a principle of social inequality. Instead, as
Kawashima explains, the “strong expectation” in
Japanese society was that disputes were to be solved
through cooperation and “mutual understanding,”

Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, Takeyoshi
Kawashima
Kawashima Takeyoshi was a Professor of Law at
Tokyo University and a visiting professor at Stanford
University from 1958 to 1959. Authoring some of the
most fundamental law textbooks on ownership and
other areas of civil law in the 1950s and 1960s, he
undeniably secured his position as one of the intellectual frontrunners in Japanese legal society.
Kawashima’s landmark piece attempted to explain
why only a small percentage of civil dispute cases were
brought to court in Japan. He presented several
different hypotheses, but the most “decisive factor”
was what he termed the “social cultural background of
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with an implicit deference to figures of authority.72
There was no rationale for majority rule; in fact, if
anything, attempts to “regulate conduct by universalistic standards” only “threaten[ed] social harmony.”73
As noted above, even though Kawashima’s focus is
on civil disputes, his basic insights have implications
in our analysis. If Japanese culture is based on principles of “mutual understanding,” one can see how an
inquisitorial system provides a neater fit for addressing
alleged crime. Authority is centralized in the hands of
the judge and public prosecutor, two figures sitting
atop the social hierarchy, and trial is conducted more
like a cooperative search for truth than a process
premised on notions of equality and universality.
In this way, it seems that we can infer that
Kawashima would argue that the longstanding Japanese tradition was incompatible with an adversarial
system such as that created by the 1948 code. Even
so, what is interesting is that Kawashima seemed to
argue in favor of a more Anglo-American system.
Indeed, in discussing the post-war changes,
Kawashima stated:

arisen.74
Thus, even though Kawashima seems to have been of
the opinion that the Japanese legal culture fundamentally clashed with the precepts of an adversarial
system of justice, it seems he also believed it was time
for that culture to change, and perhaps that the postwar legal reforms were appropriate means for doing so.
His peers appeared to be of the same opinion.
The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the
Adversary System, Kohji Tanabe
Kohji Tanabe was a Judge in the Mito District, a
visiting scholar at Stanford University, and a participant in the Japanese American Program for Cooperation in Legal Studies at Harvard Law School when he
wrote this piece in 1963. The majority of the article is
positive in nature, examining the key differences in the
Civil Code before and after 1948. However, embedded
within this analysis—and especially in his conclusion—Tanabe makes a strong argument in favor of
reforms that underlie both the civil and criminal
systems.
There were two essential pieces of his argument.
Primarily, he made it clear that he was in favor of
Japan’s system moving forward to become more
adversarial. Indeed, when describing how the role of
the individual became “more connected to the state,”
Tanabe argued that the “Anglo-American adversary
system is understandable…(and) attractive.”75 This

Traditional forms of dispute resolution were
appropriate to the old society…but all modern
societies, including Japanese society, are characterized by citizens with equal status, and,
consequently, by a kind of check and balance of
individual power…the need for decisions in
accordance with universalistic standards has
72
73

74

Loc. cit.
Loc cit.
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In 1963 Nagashima was one of, if not the dominant
mind in Japanese criminal law in the post-war era.
Serving as Counselor in the Criminal Affairs Bureau,
Nagashima was a participant in the Japanese American Program for Cooperation in Legal Studies at
Stanford University from 1956 to 1958, and represented Japan in two United Nations seminars on crime
and the treatment of criminals in 1960 and 1961. In
some ways, this piece is the most valuable opinion we
have on the subject because it directly confronted the
changes in the Criminal Code. That being said, it
seems that Nagashima agreed with Tanabe on multiple
fronts.
Like Tanabe, Nagashima argued strongly in favor of
more progressive reforms. For example, in recommending the course Japanese criminal procedure
should take going forward, Nagashima argued that
continuing down the path laid by the 1948 code
“should go far toward the creation and preservation of
a fair, scientifically sound system of criminal procedure in Japan.”80
Also like Tanabe, Nagashima seemed to acknowledge that the code left some room for old traditions to
continue. Specifically, he argued that the new code
failed to go far enough to change, first, the discretionary power of the prosecutor, and, second, the inferior
role of the defense attorney. Though the 1948 code
limited the prosecutor in important ways, Nagashima
noted that it granted the prosecutor “wide discretionary power in selecting sanctions” and did nothing to
alter the fact that, socially, the prosecutor “still occu-

sort of tone persisted when he described the reforms in
broad terms, arguing that the introduction of crossexamination, greater power for defense attorneys, and
heightened emphasis on trial procedure reforms have
placed Japan “on the road to success” and have
created “socially desirable dividends.”76
The second part of his argument is that the postwar reforms were effective in moving Japan forward.
In many ways, this is the most notable aspect of
Tanabe’s piece. Though he clearly acknowledged the
cultural tendencies identified by Kawashima,77 he
argued that the post-war changes had been “interwoven with the old structure” in such a way that “progress in adjusting and adapting…will be steady.”78
Terming Japan’s position a “midway approach,”
Tanabe noted that the new laws allowed for a sort of
productive fusion of old and new, leaving room for
judges and prosecutors to collaborate.79 The true
novelty of his argument, however, is that he believed
the new codes would, eventually, change the heart of
the nation sufficiently to lead to more reforms. This
perspective was shared by some of Tanabe’s peers who
focused specifically on criminal law, most notably
Atsushi Nagashima.
“The Accused and Society: The Administration of
Criminal Justice in Japan,” Atsushi Nagashima
76

Ibid., 109.
At one point, Tanabe directly acknowledges the
arguments made by Kawashima, see page 85.
78
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pied a status equivalent to that of judges, in which
their independence and impartiality have been protected by law.”81 Similarly, although Nagashima
acknowledged that the new code expanded the rights
of defendants substantially, he noted several shortcomings. For one thing, defense attorneys had no real
legal means of limiting interrogation times of prosecutors, if the prosecutors retained a court order for
interrogation.82 In addition, the regulations on evidence disclosure “do not reach to the name and
residence of witnesses or to documentary or real
evidence,” leaving the defense in the dark regarding
some of the most important pieces of investigation in
a case.83 Lastly, though the defendant gained the right
to remain silent in all parts of investigation and trial,
they were still not able to be a formal witness in his or
her case.84
Nevertheless, Nagashima did seem to be of the
opinion that the code placed Japan on the right path.
Indeed, in conclusion, he argued in favor of reforms
that placed a stronger emphasis on the use of evidence
rather than confessions, forced judges to take steps in
becoming more like “impartial umpires of the trial
rather than inquisitorial exposers of the truth,” and
accorded defendants greater rights.85 In this way, we
see that like Tanabe, Nagashima suggests that the

heart of the nation would change, that the very culture
of Japanese jurisprudence could be transformed. One
of the most interesting conclusions we can draw from
analyzing all three perspectives is that all of the
scholars seemed to be of the opinion that change
should happen; that is, the reforms of 1948 were steps
in the right direction.
This raises an important question: If the legal
scholars agreed that Japan should move forward in
adopting a more Anglo-American system of criminal
justice, why hasn’t Japan done so? It seems like there
are two tentative answers.
The first is that our sample of scholars is particularly skewed. Though all three scholars were widely
respected in Japan, it is important to recognize their
connection to Anglo-American life. All three worked at
American universities during their careers; all three
spoke English to some degree; and, perhaps most
notably, all three pieces were published in a volume
produced in cooperation with American authors. It
does not seem that far-fetched, therefore, to imagine
that these scholars may have been particularly sympathetic to the American cause and not necessarily
representative of the actual Japanese sentiment of the
time.
This leads us to the second possible explanation:
that the will of the people was not actually changed.
The 1948 code was comprehensive—by far the most
comprehensive and cohesive code of criminal procedure in known Japanese legal history. But cultural
traditions and ideologies forged through centuries are
not easily overridden. The 1948 code may have
changed some of the procedural guarantees of the
system and may have even changed the mindset of a

81
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notably, all three pieces were published in a volume
produced in cooperation with American authors. It
does not seem that far-fetched, therefore, to imagine
that these scholars may have been particularly sympathetic to the American cause and not necessarily
representative of the actual Japanese sentiment of the
time.
This leads us to the second possible explanation:
that the will of the people was not actually changed.
The 1948 code was comprehensive—by far the most
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with the truth that Japanese criminal procedure today
is far from the adversarial process these scholars
imagined in the 1900s point to the conclusion that the
true will and ideology of the Japanese people was not
changed with the 1948 code.
There is much room for future research to expand
upon this conclusion. Primarily, analyses examining a
wider range scholarly legal opinions, especially those
written in Japanese that may have escaped American
eyes in the wake of the war, may provide more
nuanced representations of the legal scholars’ reaction
to the new code. Also valuable would be research that
is able to tap into the reaction of common Japanese
people by surveying newspaper articles, and other
outlets of public opinion in the years following the
code’s introduction.

segment of the literati. However, when it came to
changing the fundamental way the Japanese system of
criminal justice operated, it seems that the code failed.
For success on this front requires a true change of
heart, a real change in the way the Japanese people
think about criminal justice.
If the majority of Japanese citizens shared the
opinions of the three scholars evaluated above, it
would be hard to imagine the system not becoming
more adversarial. Enough time has passed that such
a fundamental cultural change would have surely
emanated in practice. That it has not suggests that no
such change took place, that the 1948 code changed
the letter of the law, but not the fundamental underpinnings of Japanese life and culture.
Conclusion
The analysis above produces several conclusions.
Primarily, it seems abundantly clear that the 1948
Code of Criminal Procedure brought with it the most
sweeping set of changes Japan’s criminal justice
system had ever seen. Through its attempts to level the
balance of power between the prosecution and defense
and to scale back the discretion and responsibilities of
the judge, the code seemed to have given Japan a head
start in developing a truly adversarial system of
justice.
More revealing, however, is what we learn from the
analysis of the writings of the three scholars writing in
English. All three seemed to be of the opinion that the
reforms set Japan “on the right track,” that, eventually, Japan would adopt a more Anglo-American styled
system of justice, and that progress was beneficial.
Both explanations attempting to reconcile this finding
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heart, a real change in the way the Japanese people
think about criminal justice.
If the majority of Japanese citizens shared the
opinions of the three scholars evaluated above, it
would be hard to imagine the system not becoming
more adversarial. Enough time has passed that such
a fundamental cultural change would have surely
emanated in practice. That it has not suggests that no
such change took place, that the 1948 code changed
the letter of the law, but not the fundamental underpinnings of Japanese life and culture.
Conclusion
The analysis above produces several conclusions.
Primarily, it seems abundantly clear that the 1948
Code of Criminal Procedure brought with it the most
sweeping set of changes Japan’s criminal justice
system had ever seen. Through its attempts to level the
balance of power between the prosecution and defense
and to scale back the discretion and responsibilities of
the judge, the code seemed to have given Japan a head
start in developing a truly adversarial system of
justice.
More revealing, however, is what we learn from the
analysis of the writings of the three scholars writing in
English. All three seemed to be of the opinion that the
reforms set Japan “on the right track,” that, eventually, Japan would adopt a more Anglo-American styled
system of justice, and that progress was beneficial.
Both explanations attempting to reconcile this finding
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with the truth that Japanese criminal procedure today
is far from the adversarial process these scholars
imagined in the 1900s point to the conclusion that the
true will and ideology of the Japanese people was not
changed with the 1948 code.
There is much room for future research to expand
upon this conclusion. Primarily, analyses examining a
wider range scholarly legal opinions, especially those
written in Japanese that may have escaped American
eyes in the wake of the war, may provide more
nuanced representations of the legal scholars’ reaction
to the new code. Also valuable would be research that
is able to tap into the reaction of common Japanese
people by surveying newspaper articles, and other
outlets of public opinion in the years following the
code’s introduction.
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